In response to Jacob's blog post from earlier this week, I decided to address the issue of Ivan's detached contemplation, morality, and their apparent incompatibility. I think that Jacob touched upon an important aspect of Ivan's reasoning regarding morality; that Ivan believes that the only reason to live a moral life is to secure a good afterlife. While I disagree with Jacob that there is a "secular obligation" to lead a moral life, I do think that the hope of an afterlife is not the sole reason to lead a moral life. There are many people who behave morally because it is the best way to function in a social environment. Many others believe in a "humanistic" view of morality, which holds that it is both objective and based on compassion and respect for other persons (often including the animal type). Furthermore, while people clearly vary in their morals and their adherence to them, I wonder if it is possible to be amoral. If one claims that he or she wishes to live without morals, is that not a moral in itself? Are they not prescribing a way in which one (themselves) ought to live?
Is it possible to live without morals?
Sunday, May 6, 2012
Amoral until proven Guilty
In class we discussed whether or not feeling guilt was necessary to the formation of ethical beliefs and behavior. Pihlstrom posited that guilt was necessary saying that "without experiencing guilt, or at least being able to do so, we would hardly be capable of employing any ethical concepts or judgments."
I agree with Pihlstrom's claim that guilt is necessary for the formation of ethical concepts and judgments; however, I believe that this is only true if one believes in subjective morality. The nature of subjective morality being that which arises from the individual, lends itself to the notion that guilt is an integral part of the moral forming process. Guilt is the feeling which accompanies our moral analysis, it is fundamental and it allows us to assess those feelings for their cause and react accordingly. Conversely, if morality were truly objective, then it could be demonstrated in such a way that one need only apply certain rational standards to a given situation in order to determine the morality of a particular act. In this scenario, it seems as though guilt becomes unnecessary, although not unhelpful, in forming ethical judgments.
I agree with Pihlstrom's claim that guilt is necessary for the formation of ethical concepts and judgments; however, I believe that this is only true if one believes in subjective morality. The nature of subjective morality being that which arises from the individual, lends itself to the notion that guilt is an integral part of the moral forming process. Guilt is the feeling which accompanies our moral analysis, it is fundamental and it allows us to assess those feelings for their cause and react accordingly. Conversely, if morality were truly objective, then it could be demonstrated in such a way that one need only apply certain rational standards to a given situation in order to determine the morality of a particular act. In this scenario, it seems as though guilt becomes unnecessary, although not unhelpful, in forming ethical judgments.
Subjective Meaning (Q&A 2)
What is wrong with the meaning of life being subjective?
In Pihlstrom's essay, he analyzes two possible methods for determining meaning in life; one is the life of action and the other is the life of contemplation. Both theories have their strengths and weaknesses, but neither theory is satisfactory to Pihlstrom. He goes on to briefly acknowledge the possibility of a subjective meaning for life, and just as briefly dismisses it (although Jacob may have been right by suggesting that Pihlstrom was only acknowledging that it may be flawed.) Either way, Philstrom does not seriously entertain the notion of a subjective meaning for life.
It seems to me that the search for an objective life meaning ultimately ends up becoming a subjective one. This is because we have yet to discover a basis for claiming that life has a meaning beyond that which we give it. Religious groups and philosophers alike have tried and failed to prove such a claim, yet it seems to be rather straightforward. Until some higher power or universal force proclaims the meaning of life to everyone, in a way in which everyone can understand it, then there is no reference for a realistic type of objective meaning. And it seems slightly ridiculous to try and imagine one without any evidence to support that idea.
In Pihlstrom's essay, he analyzes two possible methods for determining meaning in life; one is the life of action and the other is the life of contemplation. Both theories have their strengths and weaknesses, but neither theory is satisfactory to Pihlstrom. He goes on to briefly acknowledge the possibility of a subjective meaning for life, and just as briefly dismisses it (although Jacob may have been right by suggesting that Pihlstrom was only acknowledging that it may be flawed.) Either way, Philstrom does not seriously entertain the notion of a subjective meaning for life.
It seems to me that the search for an objective life meaning ultimately ends up becoming a subjective one. This is because we have yet to discover a basis for claiming that life has a meaning beyond that which we give it. Religious groups and philosophers alike have tried and failed to prove such a claim, yet it seems to be rather straightforward. Until some higher power or universal force proclaims the meaning of life to everyone, in a way in which everyone can understand it, then there is no reference for a realistic type of objective meaning. And it seems slightly ridiculous to try and imagine one without any evidence to support that idea.
Meaning vs. Suffering (Q&A 1)
Does human suffering challenge the idea of a meaningful life?
The phenomenon of human suffering was discussed often in Pihlstrom's essay on the meaning of life. Pihlstrom used human suffering as a phenomenon that challenged the idea of a meaningful life; he argued that given all of the evil and suffering in the world, our attempts to find or create meaning for our lives becomes illusory.
I'm not sure how Pihlstrom reaches this conclusion. Nowhere in his essay does he describe how human suffering renders the concept of a meaningful life illusory, he only implies through it's presence alone that a meaningful life is irreconcilable with what he calls "meaningless suffering." I don't think that the existence of human suffering is antithetical towards meaning. In fact, I would argue that suffering is an important aspect of the human experience and it provides our lives with more meaning than an entirely pleasure-filled existence would. The atrocities that humans have faced help shape our understanding of the world, and how we as people decide to deal with these atrocities to large degree, I think, determines hte meaning or purpose of many of our lives.
Sunday, April 8, 2012
Literal vs. Textual
While a work of literature have a literal meaning within its composition, there is often an expectation that there is another textual meaning to the work which is implied by the understanding of a work as being largely representative. When we think of works of literature, we think of the implied meanings or veiled symbolism which makes the work great, but is this necessary?
I think that, to some degree, a work of literature must have a textual meaning beyond the literal understanding of the sentences it contains. I think that this basic understanding of literature acknowledges that any particular work has an intended purpose; that every literary work has a message which the author is trying to communicate through his or her story. We often ask ourselves, or others, what we "took away" from a particular literary work, in essence what did it mean to us. This meaning which we seek within a literary work is essentially our understanding of the author's communicated message, and often that understanding is not explicitly stated within a work. If it were, than why not make the claim you are trying to make and be done with it? Is the formation of literature simply aesthetically oriented? It seems more likely that literature is constructed in such a manner as to communicate some form of understanding to the audience which they could not grasp absent the work.
I think that, to some degree, a work of literature must have a textual meaning beyond the literal understanding of the sentences it contains. I think that this basic understanding of literature acknowledges that any particular work has an intended purpose; that every literary work has a message which the author is trying to communicate through his or her story. We often ask ourselves, or others, what we "took away" from a particular literary work, in essence what did it mean to us. This meaning which we seek within a literary work is essentially our understanding of the author's communicated message, and often that understanding is not explicitly stated within a work. If it were, than why not make the claim you are trying to make and be done with it? Is the formation of literature simply aesthetically oriented? It seems more likely that literature is constructed in such a manner as to communicate some form of understanding to the audience which they could not grasp absent the work.
Author vs. Writer
A good portion of our class discussions about interpretation have centered around the difference between the writer and the author in relation to a work. A writer is the actual individual who created the work, whereas the author is the particular state of mind of that writer when they composed the work. Thus, discerning the author is the much more prevalent endeavor when determining the meaning of a literary work. But this position is also fraught with some difficulty.
First of all, the actual person who wrote the novel should always be considered when one is attempting to interpret a work; while the writer's "state of mind" is important to understand, it is also important to understand the world of the writer and the experiences that he or she had through his or her life. Without any knowledge of the writer or the writer's environment, an understanding of his or her work would be woefully incomplete. Also, understanding the writer's state of mind (author) requires a certain amount of guesswork and postulation as Wollheim proposes. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that a writer might undergo several changes of "mind state" throughout the process of creating his or her work. Would this mean that a correct interpretation of a particular work would require the postulation of multiple authors in order to fully understand it? This is a position which I believe requires more defense, in regards to such an event.
First of all, the actual person who wrote the novel should always be considered when one is attempting to interpret a work; while the writer's "state of mind" is important to understand, it is also important to understand the world of the writer and the experiences that he or she had through his or her life. Without any knowledge of the writer or the writer's environment, an understanding of his or her work would be woefully incomplete. Also, understanding the writer's state of mind (author) requires a certain amount of guesswork and postulation as Wollheim proposes. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that a writer might undergo several changes of "mind state" throughout the process of creating his or her work. Would this mean that a correct interpretation of a particular work would require the postulation of multiple authors in order to fully understand it? This is a position which I believe requires more defense, in regards to such an event.
Interpretive Value (Q&A 2)
What value does an interpretation have if it does not correspond to the author’s intended message?
In the critical pluralism view of literature, there are many different and equally valid interpretations of a literary work. In Stecker's view, critical pluralism may lead to an "acceptable" interpretation of literature if it adheres to the text in some manner. Thus, the acceptability of an interpretation is confined to the work solely, and its strength is determined by the evidence the text provides for it. This would include interpretations of a work which may not correspond reasonably with the author's perceived intentions; an interpretation may still be valid even it uses a philosophical position that occurred after the author's time. The value of such an interpretation is inherent to the interpretation itself; if a particular "untrue" interpretation of a literary work somehow enriches one's perspective, than that is the value one gained from the interpretation.
In the critical pluralism view of literature, there are many different and equally valid interpretations of a literary work. In Stecker's view, critical pluralism may lead to an "acceptable" interpretation of literature if it adheres to the text in some manner. Thus, the acceptability of an interpretation is confined to the work solely, and its strength is determined by the evidence the text provides for it. This would include interpretations of a work which may not correspond reasonably with the author's perceived intentions; an interpretation may still be valid even it uses a philosophical position that occurred after the author's time. The value of such an interpretation is inherent to the interpretation itself; if a particular "untrue" interpretation of a literary work somehow enriches one's perspective, than that is the value one gained from the interpretation.
Discerning Difficulty? Q&A 1
Does the difficulty of discerning the author’s intentions render critical monism useless as an interpretation?
The theory of critical monism holds that there is one true, all encompassing interpretation of a literary work. Even if we stipulate that the critical monistic view can be reduced to an understanding of the author's intentions and environment, the difficulty of discerning the intentions with any certainty seems to be a rather difficult task. Furthermore, even if the task were undertaken and performed successfully, there is often no way to corroborate our interpretations and thereby remain open to question and criticism. What then is the value of such an endeavor?
Although we cannot be certain of an author's intention with a particular work, we can be certain that there is one. And if there is a particular message within the literary work, then it stands to reason that the message is discernible in some manner. Whether or not we can confirm the accuracy of our true interpretations is another matter fraught with more difficulty. However, it seems that the difficulty of interpreting a literary work with complete certitude does not preclude one from achieving it.
The theory of critical monism holds that there is one true, all encompassing interpretation of a literary work. Even if we stipulate that the critical monistic view can be reduced to an understanding of the author's intentions and environment, the difficulty of discerning the intentions with any certainty seems to be a rather difficult task. Furthermore, even if the task were undertaken and performed successfully, there is often no way to corroborate our interpretations and thereby remain open to question and criticism. What then is the value of such an endeavor?
Although we cannot be certain of an author's intention with a particular work, we can be certain that there is one. And if there is a particular message within the literary work, then it stands to reason that the message is discernible in some manner. Whether or not we can confirm the accuracy of our true interpretations is another matter fraught with more difficulty. However, it seems that the difficulty of interpreting a literary work with complete certitude does not preclude one from achieving it.
Friday, March 9, 2012
Ahab's Appearance
Andy asked what else we may discern about Ahab's character based upon his appearance. I think that Melville gave us a lot to think about concerning Ahab, and there is much to interpret for our understanding of the character. The description of Ahab's body as being crafted from solid bronze is meant, I believe, to convey a sense of his toughness as well as the ancient respect afforded to a classical character such as a Perseus which Melville suggests. Also, the description of Ahab as a man cut away from the stake, which the fire has wasted the limbs of without reducing any of their robustness, seems to indicate that this is a man who has suffered much and weathered a great deal, but who has survived and is stronger for it.
Sermonic Possession
In Jacob's post titled "Chapter 9," he analyzed aspects of the sermon in relation to what role the sermon played in the novel. I am inclined to think that the Sermon, while serving a number of purposes in the arc of the story and the depths of its meaning, is at least in part an instance of allegorical foreshadowing. The story of Jonah and the whale as told by the preacher is strongly related to the fate of Ahab and Moby Dick, in the sense that both men were sinful and decided to shirk the commands of God, which seemingly resulted in their related interactions with their respective leviathans. I find it more interesting, however, that some of the allegorical interpretations of Moby Dick (as nature incarnate, or God) seem to echo the lesson of Jonah; that resistance to God or nature based in the will of man is futile. The allegorical meaning is further strengthened in the comparison of the two characters, Jonah and Ahab, in the sense that Jonah was delievered from the whale (and his demise) after his sincere repentence to God, whereas Ahab never repents from his megalomaniac actions and proudly dies in pursuit of his whale instead.
Intention vs. Interpretation
In Corey's post titled "That's not what I meant," he questioned the necessity of authorial intent for a metaphor. He also discussed the virtue of interpreting an author's work in other ways from their intention.
I do not think that Corey's views on interpretation of metaphors are incompatible with my claim that metaphors are intentional. Just as an author may capture certain concepts in his work which were not intended, a metaphor may expand beyond the intended purpose of the author to include other concepts as well. This is a matter of interpretation. Interpretation allows the audience to read a story or a metaphor and speculate as to what different aspects of either mean. I think that interpretation is a valuable exercise and there are many aspects of literature that may be more fulfilling with interpretations of concepts outside of the author's intention. However, I do believe that a diligent reader will use the context of the story or metaphor in order to make a reasonable assessment of their interpretations. Also, while I noted that interpretation could, and perhaps should, go beyond the intention of the author, I firmly hold that the author's intention is an inherent part of all of their work, including their metaphors. Also, while metaphors can be interpreted in a multitude of reasonable ways, there is an intended purpose or message inherent to each metaphor.
I do not think that Corey's views on interpretation of metaphors are incompatible with my claim that metaphors are intentional. Just as an author may capture certain concepts in his work which were not intended, a metaphor may expand beyond the intended purpose of the author to include other concepts as well. This is a matter of interpretation. Interpretation allows the audience to read a story or a metaphor and speculate as to what different aspects of either mean. I think that interpretation is a valuable exercise and there are many aspects of literature that may be more fulfilling with interpretations of concepts outside of the author's intention. However, I do believe that a diligent reader will use the context of the story or metaphor in order to make a reasonable assessment of their interpretations. Also, while I noted that interpretation could, and perhaps should, go beyond the intention of the author, I firmly hold that the author's intention is an inherent part of all of their work, including their metaphors. Also, while metaphors can be interpreted in a multitude of reasonable ways, there is an intended purpose or message inherent to each metaphor.
Civilized Cannibals
In the discussion of the Sarah Ott essay, we touched upon the issue of cannibalism while discussing the opposing tensions (paradoxes) within Queequeg. While we agreed that given the context of the time in which the story was written and the general western views of both cannibals (non-Caucasian islanders, typically) and civilization, that this was sufficient to illustrate an opposing tension within the character, Professor Johnson claimed that the idea of cannibalism should, of its inherent qualities, be considered contradictory towards the idea of being civilized.
There are a couple issues at work here. First, without a clearer definition of civilized, beyond the context of the book and Melville's time period, it becomes difficult to determine if cannibalism is contradictory or not. If civilized means having qualities indicative of an organized society, than cannibalism is not a contradiction; there are many societies throughout history which have engaged in cannibalism. If civilized means polite or humane, then it may be contradictory, but there are difficulties with this assessment as well. This leads to the second issue, which is that while some people may conclude that cannibalism is impolite or inhumane, others may disagree with good reasons as well. What of a society that believes in consuming it's dead as opposed to burying them? What if the family of the deceased adheres to this practice as well, and no one connected to the deceased had strong objections in the matter? Would that be an impolite or inhumane act? I think it would be neither. What of a society like Queequeg's, which ate their fallen foes after a battle? Is that inhumane? While a good argument many be formed for the inhumaneness of fighting other humans in the first place, it may be altogether more sensible to consume the dead as opposed to wasting them or defaming them in another fashion. I think that a lot of our trouble with cannibalism is an extension of our pre-conceived cultural notions of taboos and qualms regarding the consumption of human flesh.
There are a couple issues at work here. First, without a clearer definition of civilized, beyond the context of the book and Melville's time period, it becomes difficult to determine if cannibalism is contradictory or not. If civilized means having qualities indicative of an organized society, than cannibalism is not a contradiction; there are many societies throughout history which have engaged in cannibalism. If civilized means polite or humane, then it may be contradictory, but there are difficulties with this assessment as well. This leads to the second issue, which is that while some people may conclude that cannibalism is impolite or inhumane, others may disagree with good reasons as well. What of a society that believes in consuming it's dead as opposed to burying them? What if the family of the deceased adheres to this practice as well, and no one connected to the deceased had strong objections in the matter? Would that be an impolite or inhumane act? I think it would be neither. What of a society like Queequeg's, which ate their fallen foes after a battle? Is that inhumane? While a good argument many be formed for the inhumaneness of fighting other humans in the first place, it may be altogether more sensible to consume the dead as opposed to wasting them or defaming them in another fashion. I think that a lot of our trouble with cannibalism is an extension of our pre-conceived cultural notions of taboos and qualms regarding the consumption of human flesh.
Sunday, March 4, 2012
The Whale as a Whale
The central premise of the Armstrong essay on Moby Dick was the extent to which Melville portrayed whales in either a anthropomorphic or anthropocentric fashion. We decided that Melville used both positions within his story in order to create a juxtaposition between the two conflicting concepts.
While I agree that Melville most likely implemented both viewpoints of the whale and whaling in general throughout his story, there are a couple things that we should keep in mind with our reading. It is possible that some of the anthropomorphic qualities attributed to whales, especially Moby Dick, may be serving a metaphorical or allegorical purpose beyond the mere analysis of the creatures themselves. Also, some the the passages that are anthropocentric in nature may be intended to portray specific characters in a particular manner. Or perhaps Melville was doing all of these things intentionally at the same time for all of these purposes. I simply think it's important to note that the intent of the author is notoriously hard to assess, and usually impossible to know, and therefore due consideration should be given before we claim the seemingly prevalent themes of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism throughout the novel.
While I agree that Melville most likely implemented both viewpoints of the whale and whaling in general throughout his story, there are a couple things that we should keep in mind with our reading. It is possible that some of the anthropomorphic qualities attributed to whales, especially Moby Dick, may be serving a metaphorical or allegorical purpose beyond the mere analysis of the creatures themselves. Also, some the the passages that are anthropocentric in nature may be intended to portray specific characters in a particular manner. Or perhaps Melville was doing all of these things intentionally at the same time for all of these purposes. I simply think it's important to note that the intent of the author is notoriously hard to assess, and usually impossible to know, and therefore due consideration should be given before we claim the seemingly prevalent themes of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism throughout the novel.
Caring Objectively
In class I brought up the issue of whether we can care for an object. I claimed that one can care for an object, extending from the fact that one can attribute emotional value to an object (which most everyone in the class agreed with.) The primary objection to to this claim is that people cannot care about objects that do not have intrinsic value i.e. inanimate objects.
Professor Johnson accurately described the difference (at least in regard to this particular discussion) between care and respect. Essentially, in order to respect something is to recognize it for its potential and treat it with due consideration. To care for something is to value it emotionally. I think that if we understand these premises, than the argument becomes easily resolved. We can discuss how the object itself is not the "true" focus of our emotional attachment or value, but the memories or other abstract extrinsic qualities which we associate with the object is what we actually care about. This may be true, but even then those extrinsic qualities are themselves objects, if only in an abtract sense, and at the very least they are not qualities inherent to any other being other than ourselves. . As Tom said in class, objects can serve as the embodiment of our emotional attachment, and that is all we need to value them emotionally.
Professor Johnson accurately described the difference (at least in regard to this particular discussion) between care and respect. Essentially, in order to respect something is to recognize it for its potential and treat it with due consideration. To care for something is to value it emotionally. I think that if we understand these premises, than the argument becomes easily resolved. We can discuss how the object itself is not the "true" focus of our emotional attachment or value, but the memories or other abstract extrinsic qualities which we associate with the object is what we actually care about. This may be true, but even then those extrinsic qualities are themselves objects, if only in an abtract sense, and at the very least they are not qualities inherent to any other being other than ourselves. . As Tom said in class, objects can serve as the embodiment of our emotional attachment, and that is all we need to value them emotionally.
Conscious Conundrum
In class we defined a person as the conscious subject of a life (SOAL). We listed the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person as cognitive, affective, conscious and purposeful. Although cognitive and affective seem to be reasonable distinctions (I have my reservations about the use of purposeful, but that seems to be a matter of vagueness to be settled at a later date) the issue of consciousness I find to be a contentious one.
There are several aspects of the consciousness problem we need to consider. First, that all of the necessary and sufficient conditions for life are to be considered as active states, not capacities, for an organism to be a person. Thus, a human being in a coma would no longer be considered a person, given that they do not possess, at the moment the power of consciousness. What then of a human being who is asleep? Unless we redefine consciousness in some way as to claim that human beings are conscious while they sleep, which we typically consider to be an unconscious state, then sleeping humans should not be considered persons either. This conclusion has what I consider to be disturbing implications. If the primary purpose of the designation of "person" status to certain organisms is to garner the respect and consideration such a designation deserves, then a sleeping human being would, in that sense, not be worthy of such consideration.
There are several aspects of the consciousness problem we need to consider. First, that all of the necessary and sufficient conditions for life are to be considered as active states, not capacities, for an organism to be a person. Thus, a human being in a coma would no longer be considered a person, given that they do not possess, at the moment the power of consciousness. What then of a human being who is asleep? Unless we redefine consciousness in some way as to claim that human beings are conscious while they sleep, which we typically consider to be an unconscious state, then sleeping humans should not be considered persons either. This conclusion has what I consider to be disturbing implications. If the primary purpose of the designation of "person" status to certain organisms is to garner the respect and consideration such a designation deserves, then a sleeping human being would, in that sense, not be worthy of such consideration.
Speculative Spectrum
Earlier this week in class, we discussed the "personhood" of animals. We discussed how, according to some philosophers, a person is defined as the conscious subject of a life. We also talked about how not all animals would fit under the category of a person, and as such they should not receive the same consideration.
I find it interesting that, according to this understanding of personhood, we can attribute the qualities and due consideration of a person to some animals and not to others. To the extent that we can accurately determine and measure the sentience and cognition of an animal, it seems as though there would be a spectrum of creatures endowed with characteristics both necessary and sufficient for designation as a person. While in many cases it may be easy enough to distinguish between person and non-person type animals, such as a chimpanzee and an ant, other cases might arise in which the distinction is more difficult. Is a chicken a person? What about a mouse, or a snake? Many pescatarians claim that fish should not be given the same consideration as other animals they consider persons, but is that distinction fair? And does it depend on the species of fish? When we begin to distinguish animals as persons and non-persons, where the line is drawn becomes an important issue, and thus far it seems as though the analytic consideration of these species is arbitrary and speculative at best.
I find it interesting that, according to this understanding of personhood, we can attribute the qualities and due consideration of a person to some animals and not to others. To the extent that we can accurately determine and measure the sentience and cognition of an animal, it seems as though there would be a spectrum of creatures endowed with characteristics both necessary and sufficient for designation as a person. While in many cases it may be easy enough to distinguish between person and non-person type animals, such as a chimpanzee and an ant, other cases might arise in which the distinction is more difficult. Is a chicken a person? What about a mouse, or a snake? Many pescatarians claim that fish should not be given the same consideration as other animals they consider persons, but is that distinction fair? And does it depend on the species of fish? When we begin to distinguish animals as persons and non-persons, where the line is drawn becomes an important issue, and thus far it seems as though the analytic consideration of these species is arbitrary and speculative at best.
Thursday, February 23, 2012
Literature Pursued
In response to Jake's post The Pursuit of Literature, I decided to discuss the purported purpose of the art form in relation to the intent of philosophical discourse. I agree with Jacob that the author of literature and the authors of philosophical discourse generally seem to have different intentions. I must, however, disagree on several points. First of all, while it may be commonplace, I do not think that the essential or primary goal of literature is aesthetic pleasure. As a fellow student and good friend of mine once claimed, aesthetic pleasure does not need to be the goal of an art form, literature included. One may construct a work of literature in order to shock, scare, or sadden his audience. This may seem like a trivial point, but I think it is important to address for later discussions of literature.
Second, in some cases, it may very well be that the philosopher and the novelist are working towards the same end. As an example, I think of the book "The Lord of the Flies," where I believe that Golding's intention was very much the same as Hobbes' in addressing the brutish and savage aspect of inherent human nature. While Golding may have indeed given more aesthetic consideration to his work than Hobbes did, I do not think that it necessarily means that the primary goal of the novel was some sort of aesthetic transmission to the .
Second, in some cases, it may very well be that the philosopher and the novelist are working towards the same end. As an example, I think of the book "The Lord of the Flies," where I believe that Golding's intention was very much the same as Hobbes' in addressing the brutish and savage aspect of inherent human nature. While Golding may have indeed given more aesthetic consideration to his work than Hobbes did, I do not think that it necessarily means that the primary goal of the novel was some sort of aesthetic transmission to the .
Literal Lacking (Q&A 2)
Must all metaphors have some literal equivalent?
At the outset, I would like to distinguish between the meaning of a metaphor and the function of a metaphor. Strictly speaking, a metaphor cannot contain any semantic meaning that is indescribable through literal statements. It is a function of language that allows us to understand words used in a non-literal way in order to accomplish a task; part of what makes works of fiction possible. In this sense, it seems, all metaphors would have a literal equivalent.
The function of a metaphor, however, is a different matter entirely. Davidson was right in his assertion that metaphor is a vehicle primarily designed for the function of words. Taken from the rest of his theory, I believe this aspect at least is compatible with Black's notion of the interactive theory of metaphor. At the base of the matter, metaphor is a relational mechanism; it employs aspects of a subsidiary concept in order to constitute a frame of reference for a primary concept. Much like a lens through which one should view an object, a metaphor is designed to organize one's thoughts or views of a particular concept. Here, the metaphor has no literal equivalent. One may go on to explain the metaphor in more detail, but this is not substitution for the metaphor; the structure of the subsidiary concept in relation to the framing of the primary concept is a function the metaphor achieves alone. Whether the metaphor is contained in one sentence or the comparison is drawn out and explained over an essay, the comparison itself is still inherently the same because the metaphor is still serving it's intended function.
Objectors to this claim may state that one might simply list the qualities of the primary subject which the metaphor serves to highlight or distinguish, thereby rendering the metaphor as an aesthetic feature. The metaphor, however, does more than that. Through the process of its relational mechanism (which is essentially at the heart of every comparison) it frames the primary object in a manner that allows the audience to relate through means of their other experiences or conceptualizations. Thus, the metaphor, if crafted in Black's interactive sense of the term, could not be translated literally without losing it's effectiveness.
At the outset, I would like to distinguish between the meaning of a metaphor and the function of a metaphor. Strictly speaking, a metaphor cannot contain any semantic meaning that is indescribable through literal statements. It is a function of language that allows us to understand words used in a non-literal way in order to accomplish a task; part of what makes works of fiction possible. In this sense, it seems, all metaphors would have a literal equivalent.
The function of a metaphor, however, is a different matter entirely. Davidson was right in his assertion that metaphor is a vehicle primarily designed for the function of words. Taken from the rest of his theory, I believe this aspect at least is compatible with Black's notion of the interactive theory of metaphor. At the base of the matter, metaphor is a relational mechanism; it employs aspects of a subsidiary concept in order to constitute a frame of reference for a primary concept. Much like a lens through which one should view an object, a metaphor is designed to organize one's thoughts or views of a particular concept. Here, the metaphor has no literal equivalent. One may go on to explain the metaphor in more detail, but this is not substitution for the metaphor; the structure of the subsidiary concept in relation to the framing of the primary concept is a function the metaphor achieves alone. Whether the metaphor is contained in one sentence or the comparison is drawn out and explained over an essay, the comparison itself is still inherently the same because the metaphor is still serving it's intended function.
Objectors to this claim may state that one might simply list the qualities of the primary subject which the metaphor serves to highlight or distinguish, thereby rendering the metaphor as an aesthetic feature. The metaphor, however, does more than that. Through the process of its relational mechanism (which is essentially at the heart of every comparison) it frames the primary object in a manner that allows the audience to relate through means of their other experiences or conceptualizations. Thus, the metaphor, if crafted in Black's interactive sense of the term, could not be translated literally without losing it's effectiveness.
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
Delightful Davidson
Davidson, in his attempt to conceptualize and discuss metaphors, asserted that they were solely vehicles for the use of words, devoid of inherent meaning. I've noted this all before, but I felt as though a separate post should be devoted to the disturbing implications that his positions generate.
Davidson goes on to clarify his claim of meaningless metaphors by saying that a metaphor is falsely associated with cognitive content that an author wishes to convey and that a reader must grasp in order for the reader to understand the metaphor. He believes that instead of containing cognitive content, a metaphor does its work through "intermediaries" (which he does not specify) which allow the reader to notice things she did not notice before. Furthermore, since the metaphor is not attached to any cognitive content from the author, there is not one particular way to understand it. In fact, Davidson exclaims that "there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention."
This seemingly radical notion of metaphor leaves me with a lot of questions. If the writer of the metaphor did not intend to send a message of some kind to the reader then why did she write it? Is it simply to create something which people might extrapolate infinite inferences upon? Are we, as the audience, entitled to attribute the function of the metaphor to anything we desire? Indeed, if Davidson is correct in his characterization of metaphors, I cannot think how they could be of any practical or substantive use to literature, save as a kind of linguistically constructed portrait (like Spazio) from which we can entertain notions of noticing things we may not have noticed before.
Davidson goes on to clarify his claim of meaningless metaphors by saying that a metaphor is falsely associated with cognitive content that an author wishes to convey and that a reader must grasp in order for the reader to understand the metaphor. He believes that instead of containing cognitive content, a metaphor does its work through "intermediaries" (which he does not specify) which allow the reader to notice things she did not notice before. Furthermore, since the metaphor is not attached to any cognitive content from the author, there is not one particular way to understand it. In fact, Davidson exclaims that "there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention."
This seemingly radical notion of metaphor leaves me with a lot of questions. If the writer of the metaphor did not intend to send a message of some kind to the reader then why did she write it? Is it simply to create something which people might extrapolate infinite inferences upon? Are we, as the audience, entitled to attribute the function of the metaphor to anything we desire? Indeed, if Davidson is correct in his characterization of metaphors, I cannot think how they could be of any practical or substantive use to literature, save as a kind of linguistically constructed portrait (like Spazio) from which we can entertain notions of noticing things we may not have noticed before.
Metaphorical Meanings (Q&A 1)
Is a metaphor void of meaning?
In his essay, Davidson writes that "I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use." He goes on to add "We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning)."
I have many objections to Davidson's essay, only a few of which I will enumerate here. First of all, while I acknowledge that we may draw a distinction between the meaning of words and how we use those words, I find it difficult to claim that any function of language can be exclusively either. The use of words in language may serve different functions, but the meaning of those words is integral to the communication process and thus the use for which the words are intended.
Second, Davidson's claim that metaphors have no meaning is at least partially based off of the faulty premise I argued against before. He claims that the metaphor simply uses its literal meaning to "bring something to our attention." However, when faced with a metaphor such as the popularly used "Richard is a Lion," I begin to have difficulties reconciling the message of the metaphor with the literal meaning of the words. If the nature of the metaphor functions like Davidson would have us believe, then it would make me notice that Richard is in fact a large member of the cat family. Thus, it seems to fail at distinguishing itself as a metaphor as opposed to a falsehood. But then again, with no inherent meaning or message contained within the metaphor itself, I suppose that whatever information I gleaned from my understanding of it is sufficient to appease Davidson's understanding of it's function.
In his essay, Davidson writes that "I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use." He goes on to add "We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning)."
I have many objections to Davidson's essay, only a few of which I will enumerate here. First of all, while I acknowledge that we may draw a distinction between the meaning of words and how we use those words, I find it difficult to claim that any function of language can be exclusively either. The use of words in language may serve different functions, but the meaning of those words is integral to the communication process and thus the use for which the words are intended.
Second, Davidson's claim that metaphors have no meaning is at least partially based off of the faulty premise I argued against before. He claims that the metaphor simply uses its literal meaning to "bring something to our attention." However, when faced with a metaphor such as the popularly used "Richard is a Lion," I begin to have difficulties reconciling the message of the metaphor with the literal meaning of the words. If the nature of the metaphor functions like Davidson would have us believe, then it would make me notice that Richard is in fact a large member of the cat family. Thus, it seems to fail at distinguishing itself as a metaphor as opposed to a falsehood. But then again, with no inherent meaning or message contained within the metaphor itself, I suppose that whatever information I gleaned from my understanding of it is sufficient to appease Davidson's understanding of it's function.
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