Ivan the Terrible

In response to Jacob's blog post from earlier this week, I decided to address the issue of Ivan's detached contemplation, morality, and their apparent incompatibility.  I think that Jacob touched upon an important aspect of Ivan's reasoning regarding morality; that Ivan believes that the only reason to live a moral life is to secure a good afterlife.  While I disagree with Jacob that there is a "secular obligation" to lead a moral life, I do think that the hope of an afterlife is not the sole reason to lead a  moral life.  There are many people who behave morally because it is the best way to function in a social environment. Many others believe in a "humanistic" view of morality, which holds that it is both objective and based on compassion and respect for other persons (often including the animal type).  Furthermore, while people clearly vary in their morals and their adherence to them, I wonder if it is possible to be amoral.  If one claims that he or she wishes to live without morals, is that not a moral in itself?  Are they not prescribing a way in which one (themselves) ought to live?

Is it possible to live without morals?

Amoral until proven Guilty

In class we discussed whether or not feeling guilt was necessary to the formation of ethical beliefs and behavior.    Pihlstrom posited that guilt was necessary saying that "without experiencing guilt, or at least being able to do so, we would hardly be capable of employing any ethical concepts or judgments."

I agree with Pihlstrom's claim that guilt is necessary for the formation of ethical concepts and judgments; however, I believe that this is only true if one believes in subjective morality.  The nature of subjective morality being that which arises from the individual, lends itself to the notion that guilt is an integral part of the moral forming process.  Guilt is the feeling which accompanies our moral analysis, it is fundamental and it allows us to assess those feelings for their cause and react accordingly.  Conversely, if morality were truly objective, then it could be demonstrated in such a way that one need only apply certain rational standards to a given situation in order to determine the morality of a particular act.  In this scenario, it seems as though guilt becomes unnecessary, although not unhelpful, in forming ethical judgments.

Subjective Meaning (Q&A 2)

What is wrong with the meaning of life being subjective?

In Pihlstrom's essay, he analyzes two possible methods for determining meaning in life; one is the life of action and the other is the life of contemplation.  Both theories have their strengths and weaknesses, but neither theory is satisfactory to Pihlstrom.  He goes on to briefly acknowledge the possibility of a subjective meaning for life, and just as briefly dismisses it (although Jacob may have been right by suggesting that Pihlstrom was only acknowledging that it may be flawed.) Either way, Philstrom does not seriously entertain the notion of a subjective meaning for life.

It seems to me that the search for an objective life meaning ultimately ends up becoming a subjective one.  This is because we have yet to discover a basis for claiming that life has a meaning beyond that which we give it. Religious groups and philosophers alike have tried and failed to prove such a claim, yet it seems to be rather straightforward.  Until some higher power or universal force proclaims the meaning of life to everyone, in a way in which everyone can understand it, then there is no reference for a realistic type of objective meaning.  And it seems slightly ridiculous to try and imagine one without any evidence to support that idea.

Meaning vs. Suffering (Q&A 1)

Does human suffering challenge the idea of a meaningful life?

 The phenomenon of human suffering was discussed often in Pihlstrom's essay on the meaning of life. Pihlstrom used human suffering as a phenomenon that challenged the idea of a meaningful life; he argued that given all of the evil and suffering in the world, our attempts to find or create meaning for our lives becomes illusory.  

I'm not sure how Pihlstrom reaches this conclusion.  Nowhere in his essay does he describe how human suffering renders the concept of a meaningful life illusory, he only implies through it's presence alone that a meaningful life is irreconcilable with what he calls "meaningless suffering."  I don't think that the existence of human suffering is antithetical towards meaning.  In fact, I would argue that suffering is an important aspect of the human experience and it provides our lives with more meaning than an entirely pleasure-filled existence would.  The atrocities that humans have faced help shape our understanding of the world, and how we as people decide to deal with these atrocities to large degree, I think, determines hte meaning or purpose of many of our lives.

Literal vs. Textual

While a work of literature have a literal meaning within its composition, there is often an expectation that there is another textual meaning to the work which is implied by the understanding of a work as being largely representative. When we think of works of literature, we think of the implied meanings or veiled symbolism which makes the work great, but is this necessary?

I think that, to some degree, a work of literature must have a textual meaning beyond the literal understanding of the sentences it contains. I think that this basic understanding of literature acknowledges that any particular work has an intended purpose; that every literary work has a message which the author is trying to communicate through his or her story. We often ask ourselves, or others, what we "took away" from a particular literary work, in essence what did it mean to us. This meaning which we seek within a literary work is essentially our understanding of the author's communicated message, and often that understanding is not explicitly stated within a work. If it were, than why not make the claim you are trying to make and be done with it? Is the formation of literature simply aesthetically oriented? It seems more likely that literature is constructed in such a manner as to communicate some form of understanding to the audience which they could not grasp absent the work.

Author vs. Writer

A good portion of our class discussions about interpretation have centered around the difference between the writer and the author in relation to a work. A writer is the actual individual who created the work, whereas the author is the particular state of mind of that writer when they composed the work. Thus, discerning the author is the much more prevalent endeavor when determining the meaning of a literary work. But this position is also fraught with some difficulty.

First of all, the actual person who wrote the novel should always be considered when one is attempting to interpret a work; while the writer's "state of mind" is important to understand, it is also important to understand the world of the writer and the experiences that he or she had through his or her life. Without any knowledge of the writer or the writer's environment, an understanding of his or her work would be woefully incomplete. Also, understanding the writer's state of mind (author) requires a certain amount of guesswork and postulation as Wollheim proposes. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that a writer might undergo several changes of "mind state" throughout the process of creating his or her work. Would this mean that a correct interpretation of a particular work would require the postulation of multiple authors in order to fully understand it? This is a position which I believe requires more defense, in regards to such an event.

Interpretive Value (Q&A 2)

What value does an interpretation have if it does not correspond to the author’s intended message?

In the critical pluralism view of literature, there are many different and equally valid interpretations of a literary work. In Stecker's view, critical pluralism may lead to an "acceptable" interpretation of literature if it adheres to the text in some manner. Thus, the acceptability of an interpretation is confined to the work solely, and its strength is determined by the evidence the text provides for it. This would include interpretations of a work which may not correspond reasonably with the author's perceived intentions; an interpretation may still be valid even it uses a philosophical position that occurred after the author's time. The value of such an interpretation is inherent to the interpretation itself; if a particular "untrue" interpretation of a literary work somehow enriches one's perspective, than that is the value one gained from the interpretation.

Discerning Difficulty? Q&A 1

Does the difficulty of discerning the author’s intentions render critical monism useless as an interpretation?

The theory of critical monism holds that there is one true, all encompassing interpretation of a literary work. Even if we stipulate that the critical monistic view can be reduced to an understanding of the author's intentions and environment, the difficulty of discerning the intentions with any certainty seems to be a rather difficult task. Furthermore, even if the task were undertaken and performed successfully, there is often no way to corroborate our interpretations and thereby remain open to question and criticism. What then is the value of such an endeavor?

Although we cannot be certain of an author's intention with a particular work, we can be certain that there is one. And if there is a particular message within the literary work, then it stands to reason that the message is discernible in some manner. Whether or not we can confirm the accuracy of our true interpretations is another matter fraught with more difficulty. However, it seems that the difficulty of interpreting a literary work with complete certitude does not preclude one from achieving it.

Ahab's Appearance

Andy asked what else we may discern about Ahab's character based upon his appearance. I think that Melville gave us a lot to think about concerning Ahab, and there is much to interpret for our understanding of the character. The description of Ahab's body as being crafted from solid bronze is meant, I believe, to convey a sense of his toughness as well as the ancient respect afforded to a classical character such as a Perseus which Melville suggests. Also, the description of Ahab as a man cut away from the stake, which the fire has wasted the limbs of without reducing any of their robustness, seems to indicate that this is a man who has suffered much and weathered a great deal, but who has survived and is stronger for it.

Sermonic Possession

In Jacob's post titled "Chapter 9," he analyzed aspects of the sermon in relation to what role the sermon played in the novel. I am inclined to think that the Sermon, while serving a number of purposes in the arc of the story and the depths of its meaning, is at least in part an instance of allegorical foreshadowing. The story of Jonah and the whale as told by the preacher is strongly related to the fate of Ahab and Moby Dick, in the sense that both men were sinful and decided to shirk the commands of God, which seemingly resulted in their related interactions with their respective leviathans. I find it more interesting, however, that some of the allegorical interpretations of Moby Dick (as nature incarnate, or God) seem to echo the lesson of Jonah; that resistance to God or nature based in the will of man is futile. The allegorical meaning is further strengthened in the comparison of the two characters, Jonah and Ahab, in the sense that Jonah was delievered from the whale (and his demise) after his sincere repentence to God, whereas Ahab never repents from his megalomaniac actions and proudly dies in pursuit of his whale instead.

Intention vs. Interpretation

In Corey's post titled "That's not what I meant," he questioned the necessity of authorial intent for a metaphor. He also discussed the virtue of interpreting an author's work in other ways from their intention.

I do not think that Corey's views on interpretation of metaphors are incompatible with my claim that metaphors are intentional. Just as an author may capture certain concepts in his work which were not intended, a metaphor may expand beyond the intended purpose of the author to include other concepts as well. This is a matter of interpretation. Interpretation allows the audience to read a story or a metaphor and speculate as to what different aspects of either mean. I think that interpretation is a valuable exercise and there are many aspects of literature that may be more fulfilling with interpretations of concepts outside of the author's intention. However, I do believe that a diligent reader will use the context of the story or metaphor in order to make a reasonable assessment of their interpretations. Also, while I noted that interpretation could, and perhaps should, go beyond the intention of the author, I firmly hold that the author's intention is an inherent part of all of their work, including their metaphors. Also, while metaphors can be interpreted in a multitude of reasonable ways, there is an intended purpose or message inherent to each metaphor.

Civilized Cannibals

In the discussion of the Sarah Ott essay, we touched upon the issue of cannibalism while discussing the opposing tensions (paradoxes) within Queequeg. While we agreed that given the context of the time in which the story was written and the general western views of both cannibals (non-Caucasian islanders, typically) and civilization, that this was sufficient to illustrate an opposing tension within the character, Professor Johnson claimed that the idea of cannibalism should, of its inherent qualities, be considered contradictory towards the idea of being civilized.

There are a couple issues at work here. First, without a clearer definition of civilized, beyond the context of the book and Melville's time period, it becomes difficult to determine if cannibalism is contradictory or not. If civilized means having qualities indicative of an organized society, than cannibalism is not a contradiction; there are many societies throughout history which have engaged in cannibalism. If civilized means polite or humane, then it may be contradictory, but there are difficulties with this assessment as well. This leads to the second issue, which is that while some people may conclude that cannibalism is impolite or inhumane, others may disagree with good reasons as well. What of a society that believes in consuming it's dead as opposed to burying them? What if the family of the deceased adheres to this practice as well, and no one connected to the deceased had strong objections in the matter? Would that be an impolite or inhumane act? I think it would be neither. What of a society like Queequeg's, which ate their fallen foes after a battle? Is that inhumane? While a good argument many be formed for the inhumaneness of fighting other humans in the first place, it may be altogether more sensible to consume the dead as opposed to wasting them or defaming them in another fashion. I think that a lot of our trouble with cannibalism is an extension of our pre-conceived cultural notions of taboos and qualms regarding the consumption of human flesh.

The Whale as a Whale

The central premise of the Armstrong essay on Moby Dick was the extent to which Melville portrayed whales in either a anthropomorphic or anthropocentric fashion. We decided that Melville used both positions within his story in order to create a juxtaposition between the two conflicting concepts.

While I agree that Melville most likely implemented both viewpoints of the whale and whaling in general throughout his story, there are a couple things that we should keep in mind with our reading. It is possible that some of the anthropomorphic qualities attributed to whales, especially Moby Dick, may be serving a metaphorical or allegorical purpose beyond the mere analysis of the creatures themselves. Also, some the the passages that are anthropocentric in nature may be intended to portray specific characters in a particular manner. Or perhaps Melville was doing all of these things intentionally at the same time for all of these purposes. I simply think it's important to note that the intent of the author is notoriously hard to assess, and usually impossible to know, and therefore due consideration should be given before we claim the seemingly prevalent themes of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism throughout the novel.

Caring Objectively

In class I brought up the issue of whether we can care for an object. I claimed that one can care for an object, extending from the fact that one can attribute emotional value to an object (which most everyone in the class agreed with.) The primary objection to to this claim is that people cannot care about objects that do not have intrinsic value i.e. inanimate objects.

Professor Johnson accurately described the difference (at least in regard to this particular discussion) between care and respect. Essentially, in order to respect something is to recognize it for its potential and treat it with due consideration. To care for something is to value it emotionally. I think that if we understand these premises, than the argument becomes easily resolved. We can discuss how the object itself is not the "true" focus of our emotional attachment or value, but the memories or other abstract extrinsic qualities which we associate with the object is what we actually care about. This may be true, but even then those extrinsic qualities are themselves objects, if only in an abtract sense, and at the very least they are not qualities inherent to any other being other than ourselves. . As Tom said in class, objects can serve as the embodiment of our emotional attachment, and that is all we need to value them emotionally.

Conscious Conundrum

In class we defined a person as the conscious subject of a life (SOAL). We listed the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person as cognitive, affective, conscious and purposeful. Although cognitive and affective seem to be reasonable distinctions (I have my reservations about the use of purposeful, but that seems to be a matter of vagueness to be settled at a later date) the issue of consciousness I find to be a contentious one.

There are several aspects of the consciousness problem we need to consider. First, that all of the necessary and sufficient conditions for life are to be considered as active states, not capacities, for an organism to be a person. Thus, a human being in a coma would no longer be considered a person, given that they do not possess, at the moment the power of consciousness. What then of a human being who is asleep? Unless we redefine consciousness in some way as to claim that human beings are conscious while they sleep, which we typically consider to be an unconscious state, then sleeping humans should not be considered persons either. This conclusion has what I consider to be disturbing implications. If the primary purpose of the designation of "person" status to certain organisms is to garner the respect and consideration such a designation deserves, then a sleeping human being would, in that sense, not be worthy of such consideration.

Speculative Spectrum

Earlier this week in class, we discussed the "personhood" of animals. We discussed how, according to some philosophers, a person is defined as the conscious subject of a life. We also talked about how not all animals would fit under the category of a person, and as such they should not receive the same consideration.

I find it interesting that, according to this understanding of personhood, we can attribute the qualities and due consideration of a person to some animals and not to others. To the extent that we can accurately determine and measure the sentience and cognition of an animal, it seems as though there would be a spectrum of creatures endowed with characteristics both necessary and sufficient for designation as a person. While in many cases it may be easy enough to distinguish between person and non-person type animals, such as a chimpanzee and an ant, other cases might arise in which the distinction is more difficult. Is a chicken a person? What about a mouse, or a snake? Many pescatarians claim that fish should not be given the same consideration as other animals they consider persons, but is that distinction fair? And does it depend on the species of fish? When we begin to distinguish animals as persons and non-persons, where the line is drawn becomes an important issue, and thus far it seems as though the analytic consideration of these species is arbitrary and speculative at best.

Literature Pursued

In response to Jake's post The Pursuit of Literature, I decided to discuss the purported purpose of the art form in relation to the intent of philosophical discourse. I agree with Jacob that the author of literature and the authors of philosophical discourse generally seem to have different intentions. I must, however, disagree on several points. First of all, while it may be commonplace, I do not think that the essential or primary goal of literature is aesthetic pleasure. As a fellow student and good friend of mine once claimed, aesthetic pleasure does not need to be the goal of an art form, literature included. One may construct a work of literature in order to shock, scare, or sadden his audience. This may seem like a trivial point, but I think it is important to address for later discussions of literature.

Second, in some cases, it may very well be that the philosopher and the novelist are working towards the same end. As an example, I think of the book "The Lord of the Flies," where I believe that Golding's intention was very much the same as Hobbes' in addressing the brutish and savage aspect of inherent human nature. While Golding may have indeed given more aesthetic consideration to his work than Hobbes did, I do not think that it necessarily means that the primary goal of the novel was some sort of aesthetic transmission to the .

Literal Lacking (Q&A 2)

Must all metaphors have some literal equivalent?

At the outset, I would like to distinguish between the meaning of a metaphor and the function of a metaphor. Strictly speaking, a metaphor cannot contain any semantic meaning that is indescribable through literal statements. It is a function of language that allows us to understand words used in a non-literal way in order to accomplish a task; part of what makes works of fiction possible. In this sense, it seems, all metaphors would have a literal equivalent.

The function of a metaphor, however, is a different matter entirely. Davidson was right in his assertion that metaphor is a vehicle primarily designed for the function of words. Taken from the rest of his theory, I believe this aspect at least is compatible with Black's notion of the interactive theory of metaphor. At the base of the matter, metaphor is a relational mechanism; it employs aspects of a subsidiary concept in order to constitute a frame of reference for a primary concept. Much like a lens through which one should view an object, a metaphor is designed to organize one's thoughts or views of a particular concept. Here, the metaphor has no literal equivalent. One may go on to explain the metaphor in more detail, but this is not substitution for the metaphor; the structure of the subsidiary concept in relation to the framing of the primary concept is a function the metaphor achieves alone. Whether the metaphor is contained in one sentence or the comparison is drawn out and explained over an essay, the comparison itself is still inherently the same because the metaphor is still serving it's intended function.

Objectors to this claim may state that one might simply list the qualities of the primary subject which the metaphor serves to highlight or distinguish, thereby rendering the metaphor as an aesthetic feature. The metaphor, however, does more than that. Through the process of its relational mechanism (which is essentially at the heart of every comparison) it frames the primary object in a manner that allows the audience to relate through means of their other experiences or conceptualizations. Thus, the metaphor, if crafted in Black's interactive sense of the term, could not be translated literally without losing it's effectiveness.

Delightful Davidson

Davidson, in his attempt to conceptualize and discuss metaphors, asserted that they were solely vehicles for the use of words, devoid of inherent meaning. I've noted this all before, but I felt as though a separate post should be devoted to the disturbing implications that his positions generate.

Davidson goes on to clarify his claim of meaningless metaphors by saying that a metaphor is falsely associated with cognitive content that an author wishes to convey and that a reader must grasp in order for the reader to understand the metaphor. He believes that instead of containing cognitive content, a metaphor does its work through "intermediaries" (which he does not specify) which allow the reader to notice things she did not notice before. Furthermore, since the metaphor is not attached to any cognitive content from the author, there is not one particular way to understand it. In fact, Davidson exclaims that "there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention."

This seemingly radical notion of metaphor leaves me with a lot of questions. If the writer of the metaphor did not intend to send a message of some kind to the reader then why did she write it? Is it simply to create something which people might extrapolate infinite inferences upon? Are we, as the audience, entitled to attribute the function of the metaphor to anything we desire? Indeed, if Davidson is correct in his characterization of metaphors, I cannot think how they could be of any practical or substantive use to literature, save as a kind of linguistically constructed portrait (like Spazio) from which we can entertain notions of noticing things we may not have noticed before.

Metaphorical Meanings (Q&A 1)

Is a metaphor void of meaning?

In his essay, Davidson writes that "I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use." He goes on to add "We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning)."

I have many objections to Davidson's essay, only a few of which I will enumerate here. First of all, while I acknowledge that we may draw a distinction between the meaning of words and how we use those words, I find it difficult to claim that any function of language can be exclusively either. The use of words in language may serve different functions, but the meaning of those words is integral to the communication process and thus the use for which the words are intended.

Second, Davidson's claim that metaphors have no meaning is at least partially based off of the faulty premise I argued against before. He claims that the metaphor simply uses its literal meaning to "bring something to our attention." However, when faced with a metaphor such as the popularly used "Richard is a Lion," I begin to have difficulties reconciling the message of the metaphor with the literal meaning of the words. If the nature of the metaphor functions like Davidson would have us believe, then it would make me notice that Richard is in fact a large member of the cat family. Thus, it seems to fail at distinguishing itself as a metaphor as opposed to a falsehood. But then again, with no inherent meaning or message contained within the metaphor itself, I suppose that whatever information I gleaned from my understanding of it is sufficient to appease Davidson's understanding of it's function.

Emotional Echoes

This is in response to Corey's post about the emotional response from literature as opposed to other artistic media. He bases his concept of emotion off of Malcolm Bud, who claims that emotion in relation to music is a "positive or negative response to the content of a thought." Corey goes on to note that while this definition seems to work well for literature, for music "the case seems to be not so clear as to what exactly a particular song references in terms of a concept or thought." He also says that he is skeptical of the claim that the listener has an emotional response to music because he or she recognizes a particular emotion within the song itself.

I agree with most of Corey's claims. I believe that concepts are much more difficult to discern in music (without lyrics) than in literature. I too and skeptical of the claim that our emotional response to music is based off our understanding of some concept contained within the music itself. I believe that the issue with this problem is Bud's definition of emotional response; not that it is completely invalid, but that it does not accurately describe the relationship of emotional responses to music. I have claimed in a previous post that I believe the nature of our emotions is often a pre-cognitive response to stimuli. I think that this definition applies to music. While the contents of a song may not inherently contain a particular concept or emotion, the structure, rhythm, and notes of a particular song may indeed illicit emotional responses from it's audience. Why do many of us feel melancholy when we hear a slow, resonant violin? (played in D-Minor perhaps). Or why do we get excited when we hear loud rhythmic drumming and bass, as is common amongst the dance music of today? It seems far more likely to me that our emotional response is to the direct stimuli of the music as opposed to the concept of melancholy or excitement that is imbued within the song.

The Pursuit of Ethics

In response to Andrew Bagley's post "Why does emotion matter in fiction?", he notes that by creating empathy for characters through works of fiction, an author may thereby make his or her audience "feel" something, which in turn lends itself to philosophical concepts relating to ethics. Andrew goes on to say that "This is what makes literature and probably fiction valuable for ethical philosophy, which, from my outsider's perspective (I'm not well-versed in philosophy), is not a strictly intellectual pursuit."

I found this last line of his post to be interesting, because I had never considered philosophy to transcend the confines of intellectualism (not good philosophy anyways.) I will give a great degree of latitude to the phrase "not strictly intellectual", but this leads to more questions. What degree of philosophical discourse of ethics is (or should be) beyond the scope of intellectual debate? While employing emotion may be an effective method for an author to try and cast certain ethics or axiological claims in a particular light, I think that it behooves the philosophical thinker to approach those same concepts with not only an intellectual rigor, but also a healthy consideration of the irrational biases which emotions may cause one to form.

Pathos ex Cogito

Jacob (who will undoubtedly take issue with the title of this post)brought forth in class the idea that emotion could arise from a concept. Thus, when reading about a particular character in a fictional story who elicits some type of emotional response from us, the readers, we are in fact reacting to the concept portrayed as opposed to the character itself. For instance, those who read The Scarlet Letter may feel anger towards Hester Prynne for her many betrayals, but in fact it is the concept of betrayal which we are truly reacting to. This notion of conceptual stimuli prompting emotional response seems to solve many of the issues which Walton and Radford articulate towards "real" emotional responses to fiction.

I think that people respond emotionally to conceptual stimuli on a regular basis, and the occurrence is evidenced in a spectrum of scenarios. One may feel sad at the death of a family member, one may feel sad for the death of someone they read about in the news yet never met before, and one may feel sad for the death of a character in a book or movie. These emotional responses, though they may very well vary by degree and severity, are essentially the same in nature. Our emotions in each case respond to the concept of loss (or death) and not one of them can me credibly discerned as being real in relation to the others.

Emotional Stimuli

Kendall Walton, in his essay on emotional responses to fiction, argues that emotions in general have a cognitive dimension. Walton goes on to argue that those who suppose that emotions arise independently of cognition are question-begging; they start with the premise that the individual does in fact feel the emotion and set out to explain why he does.

It seems to me that it is altogether reasonable, in dealing with emotion, to take into consideration of one's perceived feelings in response to a particular stimulus. It was, in my understanding, that particular feeling which was one's emotional response to phenomena. If one were to find a dead animal in the forest, must one first decide whether the event is worthy of emotional response before feeling sad? It seems to me that emotions arise as (seemingly) pre-cognitive responses to stimuli. Why we felt those emotions at the time is a matter of analysis post-fact. I would also like to note here that I do believe that emotions can also arise in response to conceptual stimuli as well, but that is a matter for another post.

Fictional Genesis

Walton declares in his essay that fiction need not be an artifact of human creation. Fiction is merely any object which serves as a prop in a game of make believe. He gives an example of cracks in a cave wall that miraculously spell of the beginning of a story as fiction. Indeed, this particular hypothetical would fit his definition, as it might serve as a prop to someone who decides to use it in a game of make believe. What if the inscription on the rock had spelled out something corresponding to reality? For instance, had the rocks spelled out "Istanbul is the capital of Turkey...", would we consider it a naturally occurring work of non-fiction? The limits of both Walton's and my ridiculous hypothetical aside, it is an important point to consider. While Walton would like to maintain that anything can serve as a prop for make-believe and thus be rendered fiction, it is slightly more difficult to conceive of a work being non-fiction that was naturally occurring as well.

Balance of Fiction

In his essay, Searle acknowledges that works of fiction may contain non-fictional elements. Although he does not address it, it would seem to follow that the converse of this claim would be true as well; that works of non-fiction may contain fictional elements (such as metaphors or hypothetical scenarios.) If we take these premises to be true, then it is reasonable to assume that a work of fiction is comprised of mostly pretend assertions while a work of non-fiction is comprised of mostly real assertions. In the unlikely event that a work was produced with equal parts assertion and pretend assertion, what would the work be classified as? For example, Michael Crichton's novel State of Fear is half fictional thriller and half argumentative assertions against Global Warming. All specific measurements of the work aside, it provides at least a basis for consideration of a work that might be evenly divided between fictional and non-fictional discourse.

Is Searle's definition of fiction adequate enough to effectively delineate the category?

Q&A Question 2

Is the category of fiction as encompassing as Walton claims it to be?

Walton claims that works of fiction are representations whose function is to serve as props in games of make believe. Walton goes on to add that any work that serves the aforementioned function, however minor or peripheral it may be, is a work of fiction. This is an important distinction, as it leads to more important questions he does not address. If I were to write a philosophical treatise (perhaps about fiction), and I happen to use a hypothetical example for the purposes of my argument, is my work fiction or non-fiction? Under Searle's definition, it would seem that I had constructed a non-fictional work with some fictional aspects. But Walton's definition seems to suggest a different answer. By using that hypothetical situation, I have created a prop for a "game of make believe," where the reader must imagine my hypothetical situation which does not correspond to reality. Perhaps this is just an oversight on Walton's part, but I would not feel comfortable classifying every work as fiction that may contain or employ some fictional elements.

Q&A Question 1

Is fiction necessarily comprised of pretend assertions as claimed by Searle?

In his attempt to break down the art of fiction into a series of illocutionary acts, Searle claims that fiction is comprised of a series of pretend assertions. Searle's defense of this claim seems to be strong; that a work of fiction must correspond to the pretend world in the same way that a series of assertions must correspond to reality. For the majority of fictional works, this seems to be the case. But what happens if a work is not comprised of pretend assertions, as part or all of the story does not adhere to the four criteria of an assertion? For instance, in the novel The Catcher in the Rye, the story is narrated by the main character, who at first appears to be making assertions. As the reader follows the story, however, the "truth" behind much of Holden Caulfield's narration comes into question. By the end of the story, it's not even apparent that Holden himself believes that much of what he is saying is true.

Would the Catcher in the Rye be eliminated from fiction under Searle's definition?

Necessary and Sufficient

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a work to be considered literature?

While some of us contend that literature can and should be defined classically, the burden subsequently falls upon us to demonstrate how. Jacob has already attempted this definition, and I believe it is a defensible position. Since I agree with Jacob's definition of art, and since I consider literature to be an art form, I would begin my definition of literature in much the same manner. Art is the creation of an object through the use of an aesthetic medium with the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion. Therefore, I agree with the beginning of Jacob's definition, that literature is an object created through the use of language with the intent to convey and embody a concept and emotion. The only area of contention that I thought I might have was with the qualification that literature must be a narrative. I thought that something important might be excluded with that stipulation, and I wondered why we needed to include it at all.

Then two thoughts occurred to me. The first was that without the inclusion of narrative as a descriptive qualifier, the definition of literature might then be used to include a work such as "Spazio." Also, depending on how we define narrative in this case, we may not have a problem at all. I would like to posit that narrative in this definition should mean a story or account of events; which is broad enough to include the works we should include and still discriminates against works like Spazio.

Coherent Qualification

In one of his more recent posts, Jacob posited a definition of literature. While I am a fan of this definition (mostly because it corresponds nicely to his definition of art, which I am also a fan of for personal reasons), the fourth part is the only section that I question. Jacob says that in order for a work to be considered literature, it must have a "coherent narrative." Although I'm inclined to agree that a work of literature must possess a narrative, I am dubious of the merit in including the qualification that the narrative be "coherent." I think that the inclusion of coherent in the definition may bring a host of problems in determining works to be literature. For instance, is Ulysses by Joyce literature? While I think that it clearly has a narrative, some may argue against the coherency of it. But if Ulysses satisfies the criterion, than what work would contain a narrative not coherent enough to include in the category of literature? I think that we must first define narrative and then determine whether or not the inclusion (and definition) of coherent becomes necessary.

Closed Case

In class on Monday, we discussed the difference between open and closed definitions, and which category literature may fall under. In the first essay of our assigned reading, Hirsch argues that literature must have an open definition because any closed definition of the term would not include all of the works that should be included and exclude the opposite. He claims that there is too much gray area to determine definitely which works are literature; he gives examples of hypothetical literary experts who disagree on different works to prove his point.

In class, I asked whether or not an object, which was classically defined using the necessary and sufficient criteria, could also have qualities beyond that criteria and still fit inside the definition or category. If we agree that this is true, than I think that a closed definition of literature becomes a much more viable possibility. The difficulty is reduced to establishing the basic criteria for literature, from which we can include works that may vary from each other in many different ways. While this definition may be difficult to formulate, and nigh impossible to achieve universal popularity, I believe that such an endeavor is necessary for a complete understanding of, and discourse involving, literature.

Is defining literature necessary for our class to examine the category?

Emotional Entreaty?

In response to Jacob's post "The Moral Medium," I intend to consider his claim that dialogue is the best medium for moral philosophy. I agree that a dialogue synthesizes the ease of reading with the clarity of a treatise. There is one potentially important aspect which we must consider however; whether emotional evocation is necessary for full consideration of a moral issue. Nussbaum argues that the emotional consideration is necessary, and if so, an argument could be made on behalf of narrative form, in the sense that narrative form may allow a reader to emotionally connect to an issue more than a dialogue could.

I do not think that emotional consideration is necessary, but I think that we must determine that definitively before we can claim that a dialogue is the best medium for moral philosophy.

Emotional Response

Nussbaum argues that because emotions are necessary for a full rational judgement. She asserts this point on the basis that emotions contain a certain cognitive dimension in their structure. I do not think that Nussbaum presents enough evidence to assert this claim. Just because emotions are in part thought-based, does not mean that thjey are essential to a decision making process. The consideration of emotion in certain situations (such as feeling grief at the depth of a family member) does not necessarily deserve consideration for ethical decisions. The question of how one should behave in response to the death of a family member can be considered rationally regardless of the emotions one may encounter.

Dichotomous Distress

Is all philosophical content expressed through either literature or abstract theoretical treatises, or is this a false dichotomy?

Depending on how we characterize literature, I think it is safe to say that the question above would be a false dichotomy. However, a closer reading of the text would indicate that Nussbaum does not offer such a dichotomy; she acknowledges many different forms through which philosophy is communicated. Her focus is primarily comparing her own advocacy (narrative form) and the most basic counterargument to her point (abstract treatises). I seems as though I was the only one in danger of forming a false dichotomy.

Non-Ethical Efficacy

Does Nussbaum's value of narrative form apply to philosophical concepts outside of ethics?

My first pre-critical answer to this question was yes; I believed that certain non-ethical concepts might indeed be better suited to narrative depiction. However, after reading the comment that Corey wrote on one of Jacob's blog posts (Nussbaum's Novel Notion), I decided that I was approaching this question from the wrong perspective. I agree with Corey's analysis (essentially) that different writers with different concepts will be more or less effective using different forms. It seems to be a matter of skill and preference that determines the effectiveness of communicating an idea. Furthermore, any notion of an objective manner by which we can determine the efficacy of a particular writing form for a particular concept needs much more defense than Nussbaum has provided thus far.

The Value of Axiology

The tool kit describes how the sub-domains of philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology) are all interrelated. I agreed with most of the claims made about this interrelationship, specifically between metaphysical and epistemological claims. However, I am not sure that I agree with the following claim from this section: "we cannot settle questions about either knowledge or being without raising questions of value or worth (axiology), such as whether and to what extent knowledge and truth are good or worth seeking." It seems to me that while it may be both practical and worthwhile to determine the value of knowledge before seeking it, it does not, however, seem entirely necessary to the pursuit of answering epistemological or metaphsyical questions.

Is it possible to answer epistemological or metaphysical questions without axiological consideration?

About me

My name is Brett Hinchliffe. I am majoring in Political Science and Public Policy.