Sunday, May 6, 2012

Ivan the Terrible

In response to Jacob's blog post from earlier this week, I decided to address the issue of Ivan's detached contemplation, morality, and their apparent incompatibility.  I think that Jacob touched upon an important aspect of Ivan's reasoning regarding morality; that Ivan believes that the only reason to live a moral life is to secure a good afterlife.  While I disagree with Jacob that there is a "secular obligation" to lead a moral life, I do think that the hope of an afterlife is not the sole reason to lead a  moral life.  There are many people who behave morally because it is the best way to function in a social environment. Many others believe in a "humanistic" view of morality, which holds that it is both objective and based on compassion and respect for other persons (often including the animal type).  Furthermore, while people clearly vary in their morals and their adherence to them, I wonder if it is possible to be amoral.  If one claims that he or she wishes to live without morals, is that not a moral in itself?  Are they not prescribing a way in which one (themselves) ought to live?

Is it possible to live without morals?

Amoral until proven Guilty

In class we discussed whether or not feeling guilt was necessary to the formation of ethical beliefs and behavior.    Pihlstrom posited that guilt was necessary saying that "without experiencing guilt, or at least being able to do so, we would hardly be capable of employing any ethical concepts or judgments."

I agree with Pihlstrom's claim that guilt is necessary for the formation of ethical concepts and judgments; however, I believe that this is only true if one believes in subjective morality.  The nature of subjective morality being that which arises from the individual, lends itself to the notion that guilt is an integral part of the moral forming process.  Guilt is the feeling which accompanies our moral analysis, it is fundamental and it allows us to assess those feelings for their cause and react accordingly.  Conversely, if morality were truly objective, then it could be demonstrated in such a way that one need only apply certain rational standards to a given situation in order to determine the morality of a particular act.  In this scenario, it seems as though guilt becomes unnecessary, although not unhelpful, in forming ethical judgments.

Subjective Meaning (Q&A 2)

What is wrong with the meaning of life being subjective?

In Pihlstrom's essay, he analyzes two possible methods for determining meaning in life; one is the life of action and the other is the life of contemplation.  Both theories have their strengths and weaknesses, but neither theory is satisfactory to Pihlstrom.  He goes on to briefly acknowledge the possibility of a subjective meaning for life, and just as briefly dismisses it (although Jacob may have been right by suggesting that Pihlstrom was only acknowledging that it may be flawed.) Either way, Philstrom does not seriously entertain the notion of a subjective meaning for life.

It seems to me that the search for an objective life meaning ultimately ends up becoming a subjective one.  This is because we have yet to discover a basis for claiming that life has a meaning beyond that which we give it. Religious groups and philosophers alike have tried and failed to prove such a claim, yet it seems to be rather straightforward.  Until some higher power or universal force proclaims the meaning of life to everyone, in a way in which everyone can understand it, then there is no reference for a realistic type of objective meaning.  And it seems slightly ridiculous to try and imagine one without any evidence to support that idea.

Meaning vs. Suffering (Q&A 1)

Does human suffering challenge the idea of a meaningful life?

 The phenomenon of human suffering was discussed often in Pihlstrom's essay on the meaning of life. Pihlstrom used human suffering as a phenomenon that challenged the idea of a meaningful life; he argued that given all of the evil and suffering in the world, our attempts to find or create meaning for our lives becomes illusory.  

I'm not sure how Pihlstrom reaches this conclusion.  Nowhere in his essay does he describe how human suffering renders the concept of a meaningful life illusory, he only implies through it's presence alone that a meaningful life is irreconcilable with what he calls "meaningless suffering."  I don't think that the existence of human suffering is antithetical towards meaning.  In fact, I would argue that suffering is an important aspect of the human experience and it provides our lives with more meaning than an entirely pleasure-filled existence would.  The atrocities that humans have faced help shape our understanding of the world, and how we as people decide to deal with these atrocities to large degree, I think, determines hte meaning or purpose of many of our lives.